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"The Origin of the Individual: A scientific approach to the problem of inequality

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to

Gerardo Hernández

for whom failure is nothing, but to live defeated is to die every day

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Abstract

The seventeenth century, we find, is the dawn of the individual, the emergence of a new conscience, the creation of an entity that has not and needs not social referents. As a result, modern disputes arose in deciding what the role of the State is. Therefore, public policy is oriented towards protecting individual freedom and rights against social needs. Claims for equal rights comes from the former, and claims for stability and order came from the latter. The argument that this conflict had no existence before the seventeenth century, that is, until the appearance of the individual, is the core of our thesis.

Resumen

El siglo XVII, encontramos, es el amanecer del individuo, el surgimiento de una nueva conciencia, la creación de una entidad que no tiene y no necesita referentes sociales. Como resultado, surgieron disputas modernas al decidir cuál es el papel del Estado. Por lo tanto, la política pública está orientada a proteger la libertad y los derechos individuales contra las necesidades sociales. Las demandas de igualdad de derechos provienen de la primera, y las demandas de estabilidad y orden provienen de la segunda. El argumento de que este conflicto no existía antes del siglo XVII, es decir, hasta la aparición del individuo, es el núcleo de nuestra tesis.

The Origin of The Individual

Chapter 1

Introduction

Individual versus state, and sometimes versus society, is perhaps the central issue of modern society. It is omnipresent in all media (it acquires some other forms, as freedom versus order), and internal reflexions, as natural as breathing. So essential and unresolved as all supreme fundamental and classical questions. History, society itself, is viewed as a succession of dilemmas between these two entities that lie inside each one of us, the self –free, irreplaceable, valuable– and society–necessary, oppressing, demanding. The coexistence of such antagonists is hardly conceivable; it is even more challenging to account for the long term that human existence has forced them to cohabit and struggle, and the civilization that has resulted. The preeminence of the individual, so obvious and evident, makes problematic the existence of society and its unequal regulatory state. Society is a surplus, incidental, a choice, for society is a set of individuals. There are, of course, other views that set the society as the primary entity, the individual as an object to be respected as much as possible. Public policy obeys one view or the other, nothing less. To shed some light upon these issues, we decided to search for the origin of the individual,

the one that claims untouchable rights and exercises free will, equality, and endless uncertainties.

The biological origin of humanity admits no rebuttal; prehumans were social animals. We were social before we were humans. And sociality means sustained dominant-submissive relations conforming unequal hierarchies. Nonetheless, perhaps the acquisition of the human conditions was tied to the surge of the individual conscience. The exploration of that possibility led us to the study of animal societies, their structure, and their functioning. What change was necessary to initiate the road to the human condition, was it a purely biological shift, or was it a dramatic apparition of some specific human element? The answer seems to point to the former.

Indeed, we thought, we expected, in ancient classical times, the individual was somewhat formed if not fully developed. However, our familiarity with the social ways in the animal kingdom found no more than sophisticated extensions of the animal procedures. All evidence the presence of *persona*, that is, subjects defined by social roles. As such, they cannot survive but within a society, and society holds up due to its rigidly formed constituents, *personae*. In our review of literature, that faithful mirror of human horrors and aspirations, philosophy, and historical narratives, the only characters portrayed are–unintended and hopeless un *personae*.

The seventeenth century, we find, is the dawn of the individual, the emergence of a new conscience, the creation of an entity that has not and needs not social

referents. Tragedies are no more conflicts between different social spheres and demands, but one that has no place colliding with the dull oppression of tradition. The nude *I* that thinks, finds his existence undeniable and isolated. The *tabula rasa* not only has nothing but rests alone. Free will looks to live, to find a place, to be defined. The irrevocable self that keeps one apart from the others find a similar self in them, finds the possibility of equality. Inner battles are intense and demolishing, and no contenders are present. The ethereal self that defines the individual is even more tangible than the social ties, the obligations, and sometimes than material possessions; demands acknowledgment from God, the state, society, and law. Wars, revolutions, suicides, familiar ruptures, treason, shame, not for this or that, but the sake of the self. Modernity is born, the individual is born. Such is the core of our thesis.

How is the individual possible? The question seems to be senseless, so much so that it needs an answer to make sense of it. The individual is a simple idea we live in or at least the illusion we have created of it that questioning how is it possible appears meaningless, mostly when it is the framework from which our reality is understood (though it has not always been that way). Another difficulty to answer such a question is the fact that we are dealing with a negative concept. That is, as negative as Schopenhauer (2010) understood freedom, where "free remains that which is in no way necessary, that is, dependent upon no ground. This concept, then, applied to the human will, would mean that an individual will in its manifestations (acts of will) would not be determined through causes or sufficient grounds in general". Freedom is related to the individual; the former needs the latter or it will be an impossibility, but individuality is also a negative concept because it

lacks sufficient grounds as well; it is as contingent as the environment in which we are to look for it. Contrarily, *persona* is what is necessary, what comes as given in a social ground. We propose that there was sufficient ground for, and only for, personal social existence until the seventeenth century. The fact that revolutions and democracy are identified with the individual is not a coincidence; they constitute the annihilation of given social grounds to enable the development of individuals. In other words, the origin of the individual comes with the elimination of social spheres or the simplification of a given complex social ground. Though the removal of social grounds is not a ground for the individual, that is why we say that the individual existence and its product, freedom, are contingent. Humans, however, cannot exist in the vacuum. As contingent as we may conceive it, our individual always finds itself in a social ground (however simplified); it is, therefore, an illusion.

It was not until the sixteenth century that the social ground became so saturated and complex that a convulsion, we think of the protestant reformation, and the emergence of absolute monarchies[1], derived in unstable situations where everything appeared to be contingent and arose a need to fill a void left by previous social grounds. *Persona* was the scheme by which a society conformed a hierarchical system of roles, in the sense that references for recognition could only exist in the external roles. The result of the instability was the individual.

We take as fundamental, an atomic element of the society the person. Society and person define each other. A society needs as elements figures that depend

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[1]We cannot expect that only those elements produced the fertile ground upon which the individual notion emerged. We consider them to play a role of the utmost importance.

entirely on their social relations to exist, and a person is unthinkable out of a social context. We take the term person consistently with the classical definition of "persona" (persona-ae) Norbert (1990).

> "The term person comes from the Latin persona, whose origins are traceable to Greek drama, where the $\pi\rho o\sigma\omega\pi o\nu$ or mask, became identified with the role an actor would assume in a given production. Such usage is carried over today in the word "persona", referring to characters in fictional literature or drama, or second identities which people adopt for behavior in given social contexts" (Williams and Bengtsson, 2018)

A person then conforms to a societal structure[2]. The role played, and its interactions, acquire their meaning within the rank or hierarchy each has in the social context[3].That is, their identity and recognition realize within a structure, and every action is meaningful if it is a social action, with an external reference value. In a given social context, an action may give hierarchy or object of moral judgment, but in another, it may be something irrelevant without meaning and implications. For it to be social, it must "take account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber, 2009). In each social structure, meaningful social acts are limited and recognized depending on the status of the agent.

Modern society is so much used to the notion of individual that we define society as a set of individuals; with such a notion history, however far back in time it

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[2]An example of complex and not individual analysis can be seen in Flores-Vargas et al. (2018)

[3]Ants, as an incredible simplified for example, could be understood as persons, each one behaving depending on the role taken in the social structure(Hölldobler et al., 1990).

goes, is written. History has the task of making the past intelligible to the present. Moreover, the present feels comfortable attributing to our ancestors dilemas, judgments, desires, and aims similar to our own. It seems that the glorious past of classical times full of persons, evolved ants, or primates is insufficient to explain the science, art, philosophy that so well accomplished. Nevertheless, a high degree of intelligence is compatible with a lack of inner life that only recently appeared in humanity. The reader ought to wonder, what then can we understand as an individual.

The individual pervades the realm of language. It is an illusion of realized intentions. It involves some self-referents for individual existence, allowing an inner "I", or self, taking and unstable and contingent internal reference to shape the world rather than a given social framework[4]. Some of the characteristics of such individual inner self are:

1. The individual recognizes his inner space, which ends the idea of the adequacy of the subject to the object. It allows in a Kantian interpretation of submitting the object to the subject (Deleuze, 2008), "learning from nature according to what reason has put in it" (Colomer, 1986).

2. Chooses what to see out of his own schemes; without them, a perception might signify nothing to him. In that sense, the individual has an internal reference to perceive and interpret the world. The metaphorical "I".

3. A metaphorical "I" independent of the roles and hierarchies that give mean-

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[4]It goes from creating internal images using the experience as metaphore, to imposing to the experience the inner schemes of comprehension.

ing to a person in a social context.

4. A metaphorical "I" that orders, shapes, and gives meaning to experience and memories (narrates). Which allows having some expectancies of action and how to interpret novel situations out of the sense given to himself.

5. Not a finished illusion, the individual must keep creating itself. It means that it is always becoming.

6. Indeterminate, without content.

7. Godless, which means the rejection of morality and the creation of ethics. A self-principle creating being.

8. Formed out of social exhaustion, filling the void produced by institutions, roles, and hierarchies in their self-development in complexity. To the point of conforming now the framework to understand social contexts.

9. No longer projects external references to conform to his sensations, thoughts, or actions as an analog of a social context (the behavioral world).

10. Invented principles or ethical values, not learned as it would be the case of morality, where tradition ought to be known so the person knows which action can be social.[5]

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[5]That is why Kierkegaard (Hong et al., 2000) claims "the crucial thing is to find a truth that is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die" and immediately adds "of what use would it be to me for truth to stand before me, cold and naked, not caring whether or not I acknowledge it, making me uneasy rather than trustingly receptive. I certainly do not deny that I still accept an imperative of knowledge and that through it men may be influenced, but then it must come alive in me, and this is what I now recognize as the most important of all".

The difference observed out of the elements just mentioned, is that the reference for a personal role in a society is always external and oriented to others. The reference for individual existence must always be internal, the inner life which influences his personal experience, transcending it to the point that even the societal structure that gives meaning to the notion of person is internal. In this way, the individual action is not oriented towards others, although with the illusion of it, it transcends the sphere of the person and its social action. Therefore, being social precedes individual existence, but the individual that has emerged has inverted the relation.

It is though the analysis of the conditions of possibility for individual existence that we can distinguish the difference between individual and personal existence. The weakening of personal existence came with the saturation of life as it became more and more complex. When opportunities of mobility in such complex reality were either impossible or very unlike, the only reasonable consequence is either move towards another society where personal spheres are still not saturated, to queue, or to break such rigid structure to achieve simplicity. Such simplicity of reducing personal spheres does make the appearance of the individual more likely. We argue that such a process is as follows: As dominion becomes dissociated with reproduction making the appearance of households possible, households and the broken linkage just mentioned favor genetic diversity as well as density of population. As societies get denser and absorb other groups, there is also cultural appropriation and expansion that increases personal social spheres (more spheres make a specific society more complicated). The latter creates a complex language where metaphors tend to dissociate language from its immediate external reference. Complexity and metaphors precede and allow moralizing-gods whose

appearance allows stability, which renders space for increasing complexity until a saturation leads to the return to straight-chain hierarchies. Such despotic structure emerges when personal spheres become exhausted; its supplantation by a stable, more straightforward, and more vertical organization is the condition for individual existence. Therefore, once a societal organization becomes exhausted for achieving complexity, it does not allow social mobility, following either migration by its members, or the supplantation by another organization. In this case, the removal of all those spheres leaves a void that needs to be filled up. The individual, or the illusion of it as we propose, fill all those gaps, becoming the framework to interpret the world, and producing a metaphorical 'I' that creates its principles and values out of internal references.

It was not until the 17th century that the emergence of the individual was possible. We propose the necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for personal existence to distinguish it from the individual's condition of possibility. It will make clear how in all conditions but one, we encounter personal existence[6]. Personal conditions developed without the notion of the individual, but once it appeared, it was used as the framework to understand the world. The individual is the core of modernity, but it does not replace the persona; without a persona, there is no society. The uneasy coexistence of both defines the core modern times.

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[6]Clearly, more conditions for individual existence are needed.

1.1 Methodology

We used an interdisciplinary hermeneutic methodology where we compared socio-biological data with political philosophy and literature. The comparison was made between what we described above as elements that configure individual existence with those we consider to be of the *persona*, to see when it emerged.

1.2 General Objective

To show that individual existence emerged in the seventeenth century and it was possible out of a simplification of social spheres.

1.3 Particular Objectives

1. To show that before the seventeenth century there is not individual manifestation in literature

2. Show the gradual development of social spheres that aimed toward a saturation.

3. To give a new interpretation that shows changes in civilization.

4. To show that referents stopped being external to become internal.

Chapter 2

Personal conditions of possibility

2.1 Sociality

It is the starting point, or the point of no return where gradual complexity is to take us to the developement of personal spheres, which means that we were social animals before we became individual human beings. By sociality, we understand the biological sphere which includes eusociality traits and hierarchies. In such traits, societies are: "a) divided into reproductive and non-reproductive (or at least less-reproductive) castes, b) adult colonial members belong to two or more overlapping generations, c) care cooperatively for the young"[1] (Wilson and Hölldobler, 2005). In the first trait such division is ought to the fact that "social hierarchies and their perception are a mechanism of fundamental social organization in many animal species, including human, which has a profound impact on aspects such as survival,

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[1]Although there is a controversy whether Homo Sapiens can be taken as a eusocial animal (Gintis, 2012) or not. We decided to keep the terminology Wilson and Hölldobler (2005) gave. Because it includes sterile castes or those that having the capacity to reproduce do not do so out of their socio-reproductive organization. This works when considering other human species as we will argue.

social and reproductive behavior and health" (Rizo Martínez, 2018). Although not all the traits of the biological sphere are taken into consideration, we take those which are relevant for the sake of our argument. Also, though the biological sphere is the basis in human primates, other spheres (economic, cultural, historical, political, familiar, religious, etc.) clash and superimpose with it.

Both elements mentioned in the social sphere are related, dominion is linked with reproduction as being a subordinate is with taking care of the young. We understand that the "dominance order, sometimes also called the dominance hierarchy or social hierarchy, is the set of sustained aggressive-submissive relations among these animals" (Wilson, 1978). Those relations depend on rank, which has its external reference in the link just mentioned.

2.2   Socio-Reproductive structure linked with dominion

Within the aggressive submissive relations in social hierarchy certain benefits come with it, depending on the rank each has in a society. Mostly, "to dominate is to possess priority of access to the necessities of life and reproduction" (Wilson, 1978), but also among those necessities are food, nests sites and mates (Wilson, 1978). The fact that rank has benefits is shown among other things in the link between reproduction and dominion. We can see that in a laboratory study with mice where: "dominant males, constituting one third of the population, were the fathers

of 92 percent of the offspring"[2] (Wilson, 1978). Such linkage is present in the socio-reproductive organization; in chimpanzees "most competition for females occurs between males of intermediate rank, whereas the alpha male is able to monopolize females when it suits him to do so" (Reynolds, 2005). It is mentioned as well by the previous author that females make most of the percentage of approximations, but the Alpha male (Reynolds, 2005) owns the higher frequency of copulations. The consequence is important, in the population mentioned by the author, the second in rank (Beta) had less frequency of copulation in relation with the Alpha and was unable to produce offspring during the study (Reynolds, 2005).

> "Male alpha rank was correlated with the number of possessive copulations, and the majority of possessive copulations were found in the alpha male (57%). Apart from the alpha male, however, the correlation was not statistically significant, and it seems that possessiveness was a successful strategy of the alpha male only, as was found at Gombe (Tutin 1975) and Mahale (Hasegawa and Hiraiwa-Hasegawa 1983)" (Reynolds, 2005)

Another example is the recognition of gradual evolution in ants, where "well-developed colonies typically have only a single queen" (Hölldobler et al., 1990). The relation between reproduction and hierarchy is so strong that when introducing "two queens to a group of queenless workers, the queens behaved amicably toward each other at first, but later one began to dominate the other by standing above her at frequent intervals. Later the workers expelled the subordinate queen by repeatedly dragging her outside the nest" (Hölldobler et al., 1990). The gradual

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[2]It is interesting that males first fought to establish hierarchies, which once established became stable (Wilson, 1978).

evolution of ants, being similar to one of the wasps, according to Hölldobler et al. (1990), shows us that subordination comes at the cost of reproductive suppression.

Domination also has repercussions on the access of necessities, such as vital nests and food, but "escalated conflict is more likely where subordinates are reproductively suppressed" (Cant et al., 2006). Some strategies are required to avoid conflict, reduce stress, and violence of subordinates. For example, in baboons, some copulation is allowed to lower and subordinate ranks when females have a partial swelling (Wilson, 1978), "but during the five to ten days of maximum swelling, when ovulation occurs, only the most dominant males of the troop copulate with the females" (Wilson, 1978). We understand that it is a gradual process where first copulation is allowed to subordinates, but not reproduction, and then some copulation and reproduction are allowed to some members, not any members but kin as with chimpanzees (Morin et al., 1994; Wilson et al., 2014). Such strategies make it more likely that subordinates will queue rather than engage in conflict[3]. Although genetic relatedness does not appear to have a significant effect on the possibility of escalated conflicts, it does answers for the possibility of reproductive sharing (Cant et al., 2006), which "can promote stability of the dominant-subordinate relationship" (Cant et al., 2006).

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[3]Another compelling case that of bonobo's female-based societies, which some consider being egalitarian. We can observe the link between dominion and reproduction in the fact that "dominant bonobo females interfere with the copulations (with males) of subordinate females and may harass the offspring of these subordinates" (Geary, 2004). Therefore, a lack of respect for equal worth or social status is present.

2.3 Kin selection hypothesis as a strategy for reducing inside group's conflict

An adaptive strategy to avoid internal conflict, and the possibility of subordinates to engage in it for getting access to resources, can be allowing some members of the group to reproduce, those who are kin. Established hierarchies are tough to change; even engaging in conflict, the possibility of losing is very high (Wilson, 1978), "it is this asymmetry in the payoffs of winning, rather than in strength, that underlies the overwhelming success of dominants in escalated conflict" (Cant et al., 2006). "The hypothesis that the more closely related males form a kin group that cooperates to defend a territory, thereby increasing access to females and resources" (Morin et al., 1994) explains an adaptive strategy of the dominant rank to make subordinates not to engage in conflict, make it more difficult, migrate or as Cant et al. (2006) argue, they would instead queue for the small possibility of a positive outcome. Female dispersal behavior could unriddle the lack of extensive inbreeding alongside the relatedness of males (Morin et al., 1994). These elements establish the basis and the necessity to take conflict and violence outside the group, and for that reason "lethal aggression occurs within a diverse set of circumstances, but is expected to be most commonly committed by males; directed towards males; directed towards non kin, particularly members of other groups; and committed when overwhelmingly numerical superiority reduces the costs of killing" (Wilson et al., 2014).

With such male relatedness and female dispersal behavior[4], it comes naturally

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[4]Such female exogamy or dispersal behavior can also be seen from the Late Neolithic to the

kin's band formation (tribes) to go and take out their male competition in other groups (external), allowing the not so high ranks to copulate, and eventually to reproduce, taking violence outside of the group as an outcome, as well as increasing genetic variability. Numerical superiority is both a key to success in overpowering other groups and a possible outcome of such behavior, lowering the risk of engaging in internal conflict.

2.4   Pandora's Hypothesis (New socio-reproductive structure)

After Kin selection or allowance of reproduction to certain members of society, the next step is the difference Wilson (2012b) claims about *homo sapiens* where:

> "Even by strictly technical definition as applied to animals, Homo sapiens is what biologists call "eusocial," meaning group members containing multiple generations and prone to perform altruistic acts as part of their division of labor. In this respect, they are technically comparable to ants, termites, and other eusocial insects. But let me add immediately: there are major differences between humans and the insects even aside from our unique possession of culture, language and high intelligence. The most fundamental among them is that all normal members of human societies are capable of reproducing and that most compete with one another to do so".

Leaving kin behind and allowing all ordinary members of the society to repro-

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Middle Bronze Age in southern Germany (Mittnik et al., 2019).

duce and compete to do so is a considerable difference in homo sapiens; we hypothesize that it was not a distinction acquired by all human species, but specifically by homo Sapiens or Ancient Modern Humans. It means that at least one of the human species with which they coexisted, and the one we have more information until now, did not have such socio-reproductive organization described above.

The human species we are referring to were the Neanderthals; their socio-reproductive structure kept the linkage between reproduction and dominion. We propose this conclusion out of the analysis of the following data:

1. There were lower density groups of Neanderthals in comparison with early modern humans (Stringer, 2012). We can expect Neanderthals had a socio-reproductive organization where breeding was not for all normal members of their society, even if they could do so[5].

2. Such linkage in Neanderthal societies can explain "the variable absorption of populations of late archaic humans (Neanderthals) in the process" (Trinkaus and Svoboda, 2006) by Early Modern Humans. Nonetheless, they did not absorb Ancient Modern Human populations, most likely out of their closed society because of their link.

3. As can be seen in Rizo Martínez (2018) much stress comes from being a subordinate, which derives in reproductive suppression. Only after the absorp-

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[5]In (Stringer, 2012) the absence of division of labor, accounted by low levels of sexual dimorphism, explains the low density of Neanderthals. However, a new study argues "that Neanderthals followed largely similar modes of endocranial development to modern humans" (de León et al., 2016). Therefore, if Neanderthals had prolongated infancies(Gibbons, 2008) similar to modern humans, we can expect a division of labor where females and elders would have to be there for caring for the children with a certain degree of division of labor.

tion of the Neanderthal population, breaking the linkage of dominion and reproduction, stress decreased (Trinkaus and Svoboda, 2006). Something expected when there is a difference among organizations[6] before and after the absorption. As Trinkaus and Svoboda (2006) say, there were changes in behavior and adaptation.

4. We can claim this out of archaeological rests, that is, the "link between social behavior and spatial distribution of material debris" (Domínguez-Rodrigo and Cobo-Sánchez, 2017). In that relation, "the result of a socio-economic organization by early humans that differed from those currently documented among H. Sapiens foragers" (Domínguez-Rodrigo and Cobo-Sánchez, 2017) in the paleolithic can be observed. It is also possible that "nuclear families as social entities clearly demarcated from the social group had not yet appeared in human evolution. The cooperative and food-sharing behavior exhibited at that time through central-place provisioning (Marlowe, 2006) must have been based on a different social structure, which emphasized group dynamics (probably based on kin) over separated reproductive units" [7] (Domínguez-Rodrigo and Cobo-Sánchez, 2017).

5. If Neanderthal societies had a socio-reproductive organization where all their normal members were breeders, we could find evidence of offspring with early modern human females. In that case, the merging could have occurred in

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[6]It may be possible that even early modern humans had the Neanderthal structure, what may have caused the change we cannot tell.

[7]Only separate reproductive units can reduce stress and violence, it is the symbol of a different socio-reproductive organization. Enabling more reproductive units is coherent with expecting more reproduction, as well as less interference of the alpha-rank; that is, such rank stops monopolizing possessive copulations. Such practices make increasingly denser societies and with it, more probabilities for survival.

both directions. As the Neanderthal "Y" chromosome has not been observed in modern humans (Mendez et al., 2016), we can deduce it is because no male son receiving such a chromosome survived; as we had said, they had limited possibilities of survival by numbers. Although Neanderthal females got absorbed out of dispersal behavior, by ancient modern humans, their males kept their ranks and organization.

6. Inbreeding in Neanderthal societies (Prüfer et al., 2014; Ríos et al., 2019) shows their closeness and how reproduction was very close to dominion. We can deduce that their female dispersal behavior benefited mostly Ancient Modern Human societies, allowing genetic diversity and cultural appropriation. Even chimpanzees differ from Neanderthals in this aspect, they avoid inbreeding not only by female dispersal behavior, but allowing kin to reproduce taking violence to other groups to do so[8].

Our Pandora's hypothesis, alongside Neanderthal socio-reproductive organization, explains the mechanism of absorption as follows: Neanderthal females, with their culture and its transmission through progeny, were absorbed by a society that has all their ordinary members as breeders, took advantage of their dispersal behavior. It explains why in modern humans, the Neanderthal "Y" chromosome is lacking[9], as the males were not absorbed, either out of keeping a vertical structure in their society or the lack of numbers to take Early Modern females. As a con-

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[8]It makes us think that even Chimpanzees developed a socio-reproductive structure that differs from that of Neanderthals, and that is why even with human presence they have managed to survive.

[9]As mentioned in point "5" above. Also, it is interesting to observe that it is not something isolated in time. We can find in recent studies how by "∼2500 BCE and, by ∼2000 BCE, the replacement of 40% of Iberia's ancestry and nearly 100% of its Y-chromosomes by people with Steppe ancestry" (Olalde et al., 2019).

sequence, it clarifies why the alpha male position had a propensity for inbreeding, allowing the highest rank most of the possessive copulations. Although inbreeding could have been solved taking violence outside by attacking external groups to get females, it seems very unlikely when their females were absorbed by Ancient Modern Humans, whom having all their members as breeders competing to do so, achieved denser societies. Our hypothesis would be a specific type of merging, where only a gender got absorbed.

It also explains why, after the Interpleniglacial period, there were "changes involving manipulative behaviors, locomotor patterns, and decreases in overall stress levels" (Trinkaus and Svoboda, 2006)(changes of behavior and adaptation). The tension of subordinates with dominants lowered, as a result of less reproductive suppression out of the extinction of Neanderthal socio-reproductive organization in favor of the social conquest by Early Modern Humans. As Wilson (2012a) puts it, frequent sexual activity reduces aggression among males (less need to engage in conflict and with it a decrease of stress).

Finally, our hypothesis does take into account the existence of interbreeding between the two species (Prüfer et al., 2014) and the fact of encountering not a small percentage of Neanderthal genes[10] in the total amount of modern genomes (Gibbons, 2014), makes the Replacement Model that Harari (2014) inclines toward less likely.

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[10]Different teams have recovered between 20% and 30% of the total Neanderthal genome (Gibbons, 2014). It means that, when taking the total variability and not individual percentages, we find that the amount of Neanderthal genome in a given population is higher than expected.

Despite these arguments, Neanderthals were by no means inferior to Early Modern Humans. They had large brains (Papagianni and Morse, 2015; de León et al., 2016) and there is evidence of high degree of intelligence; they had abstract thought and recent findings conclude that the first cave paintings belong to them (Hoffmann et al., 2018).[11] They had stone and wood technology as well (Aranguren et al., 2018; Muller et al., 2017); children already had prolongated infancy (Gibbons, 2008) which concurs to the development of the brain[12], (de León et al., 2016) requiring division of labor in society to take care of children. Fire was known and used efficiently (Roebroeks and Villa, 2011; Albert et al., 2012), they arrived earlier than early modern humans to colonize Europe (Bae et al., 2017) and the more new findings occur of this human species, the closer the gap between them and early modern humans[13]. What Neanderthals lacked was a density of population as an outcome of a socio-reproductive organization, which makes the possibility of survival higher.

[11]Although sociality has been the main trait to argue development and larger brains, the size of the latter is predicted by diet (DeCasien et al., 2017), and Neanderthals are known to have had meat consumption (Stringer, 2012) as well as larger brains (Papagianni and Morse, 2015) than their Early Modern Humans competitors.

[12]This trait is crucial because it changes our understanding of the social configuration. Stringer Stringer (2012) attributes the low density of Neanderthals to the absence of division of labor, which he justifies by the low levels of sexual dimorphism. Nevertheless, a new study argues that the growth pattern of the brain in Neanderthals no longer can be understood to be similar to one of the chimpanzees, but "the new data indicate that Neanderthals followed largely similar modes of endocranial development to modern humans" (de León et al., 2016). So, if we have prolongated infancies in Neanderthals as well as with modern humans, we can expect a division of labor where females and elders will have to be there to take care of children. In other words, lower density in Neanderthal societies ought to be looked for in another trait.

[13]We can see this in the fact that "in recent years new research has pulled the Neanderthals much closer to us. Not only did they have brains as large as ours, but they also buried their dead, cared for the disabled, hunted animals in their prime, used a form of spoken language, and even lived in some places as the modern humans who were their contemporaries. They could not have survived, even in warmer times had they not mastered fire and worn clothes. Though they relied heavily on meat, they could also fish and harvest seafood. These are all behaviors that at some point, were thought to be exclusive to ourselves" (Papagianni and Morse, 2015).

2.4.1 Other Hypotheses

To ask what happened with Neanderthal's societies is a question that may show a preconception on our species. That is, when dealing with two competing human species, it is easy to try and take evidence towards what we believe is the nature of the survivor. Some theories trying to answer that question are:

1. An example is Flannery (2012) who argues that "the advantages of clan-based societies may even tell us something about the disappearance of the Neanderthals. Neanderthals displayed low population densities and showed no archaeological evidence for social units larger than the extended family". The lack of population density makes Flannery (2012) to argue that "societies with clans are much more likely to engage in group violence than clanless societies. This fact has implications for the origins of war. Societies with clans also tend to have greater levels of social inequality". In this order of ideas, we can appreciate that though the formation of tribes does correspond to a structure of "us against them" (Flannery, 2012), it does presuppose such conflict out of one variable, which is the density of population and going beyond the extended family. Nonetheless, the variable just mentioned may have the outcome of wiping out the supposedly more egalitarian organization or including them as "us".

2. Sterelny (2012) recognizes a small density of population and the stress Neanderthals had in the Interpleniglacial period. However, he focuses the analysis in what is the central claim of his whole work, that is, "that the distinctive character of human social life depends on the accumulation, preservation,

and intergenerational transmission of cognitive capital". Though an excellent hypothesis, it does not say why Neanderthals had low-density populations compared to Ancient Modern Humans. The fitness trap, as he calls it, resides in cooperation indeed, but in a specific type of cooperation, that afterward expresses itself in everything else, as the transmission of culture and the numbers for keeping it, and for having a division of labor. That is why, his "Grandmother Hypothesis" which states that "we have long childhoods because we are large, not because we need twenty years of education in foraging life," can be taken in our perspective as the outcome of the sexual revolution explained in the Pandora's hypothesis above. That is, a new socio-reproductive organization allowed the numbers first, then longer childhoods and denser populations for keeping and transmitting culture were possible.

3. Pääbo (2014) proposes the idea of a "replacement crowd" that mixed with modern humans who mated with Neanderthals, but not with Neanderthals themselves. Nonetheless, Pääbo (2014) recognizes that the previous "indirect model is admittedly pure speculation", while another explanation may be "that the interbreeding in the Middle East was followed by a particularly large growth of the population that had mixed with the Neanderthals [...] or perhaps there was later migration from Africa into Europe that 'diluted' the extra Neanderthal contribution in Europe".

2.5 Appearance of separate households producing denser populations.

The separate reproductive units mentioned before produced separate households. Even when moving a lot, societies acquired an organization where a central provisioning place was not enough. With many breeders comes the necessity of nuclear families and a separate place for each. A place that is not common allows the avoidance of reducing all possessive copulations to the alpha rank.

As it was mentioned, this element is a consequence of the success of a socio-reproductive organization. Gradually the possibility for engaging in conflict with the higher ranks of society has been diminished out of less reproductive suppression. Also, the possibility for survival increased because of denser populations. In a way, this possibility of forming nuclear families comes from having separate households.

The utility of having nuclear families in separate households cannot be stressed enough. It certainly lowers the possibility of conflict, but more than that, it symbolically recognizes the possibility of possessive copulations to all normal members of society, and of a physical place that is not communal. It makes it easier for most of the persons of the society to find someone with whom they will be able to breed, once possessiveness is established in each household. The rest, those who are not members of a household or lacking possession of one, ought to respect not taking what is already possessed, but acquiring the possibility to possess with more partners available, now that there is not a monopolization of mates by the

alpha rank, its kin, etc.[14]

In this element, a cession of dominion can be observed, the dominion of the higher ranks became more symbolic, or in other words, it is no longer directly linked with reproduction. This organization can be seen very well established after the paleolithic period, from the Late Neolithic to the Middle Bronze Age (Mittnik et al., 2019; Kuijt and Goring-Morris, 2002). That is, households with patrilocality, or "males predominantly staying, or at least being buried with their families" (Mittnik et al., 2019) and with females moving from adolescence onwards (Mittnik et al., 2019). Such female exogamy comes from the female dispersal behavior we recognized as already present in the Paleolithic, as well as the relatedness and hierarchy of males whom stay and form groups mainly on kin, so we think though unequal as Kuijt and Goring-Morris (2002) and Mittnik et al. (2019) recognize, still, we cannot say that hereditary elites came with the emergence of households as Mittnik et al. (2019) propose[15].

The ancient Greek world is a good example of this aspect where reproduction and hierarchical power are found symbolically related in the household organization[16]. For instance, in the Iliad, where behaviors that show such relation are

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[14]We can trace the origin of the institution of marriage to this condition. When possessiveness of mates is respected in each household, it allows less reproductive suppression and a higher possibility of encountering mates by those who are still lacking. We can say that marriage emerged to reduce conflict and violence.

[15]We do agree with Mittnik et al. (2019) that the households of the Early Bronze Age "seem similar to the later historically known *oikos*, the household sphere of classic Greece, as well as the Roman *familia*, both comprising the kin-related family and their slaves".

[16]We can expect that ancient human societies have political and cultural practices closer to biological needs. The more complex the culture gets the more symbolic and less related with its biological foundations, to the point where symbols become something else than they were at the beginning when there was a biological proximity.

depicted by the heroes of the narrative. One of the most impressive parts of the epic deals with the rage of Akhilleus caused by the loss of his recognition when Agamemnon claims his prize, a girl named Briseus, after having been deprived of his own status-prize first, a girl named Khryseis (Fitzgerald, 2008). Although in our modern eyes we can be tempted to put love or a humbler feeling to such a fury between Akhilleus and Agamemnon, what we can find in the narration is nothing of that sort. In the latter, what he wants to show after losing his prize and taking the one of Akhilleus is "who is the stronger and make the next man sick at heart—if any think of claiming equal place" (Fitzgerald, 2008). Akhilleus claims his place and prize for being an outstanding warrior, and with it the symbolic recognition that Agamemnon enjoys, although not risking spilling blood in battle. It is a struggle of status, and the more symbolic it gets for not killing each other, the more the place as a breeder and not taking any other treasure but women are depicted in the narration. Possessiveness and frequency of copulations as well as the higher probability of producing offspring is related symbolically to the alpha male. In this case, the metaphorical status to preserve his *oikos* and to be recognized as an alpha male is being threaten. Dominion has been dissociated with the capacity of breeding, but those reminiscences made that lost link to be present symbolically.

That women are taken as a metaphor is something to be expected in Greek mythology according to Woodard (2007) because:

> "Mythical stories are fabulations of women, probably not created by
> women. In those narratives, as in other dominant discourses, they are
> used as metaphors. Still, contrary to official history, women have been

important motors of mythical (his)stories. History comes from discord, and discord comes from women. Helen, Medea, Europa, Arianna, Io, Pasifae and Phaedra were objects of rape, kidnapping, abandonment and betrayal; but they were also subjects of pleasure, of movement, of revenge".

Therefore, Briseus is a metaphor, the discord between Akhilleus and Agamemnon over dominion and rank. Even the Trojan War itself, as decribed in the Epic Cycle by Proclus (Burgess, 2001) started its discord metaphorically when the goddesses made Alexander to choose who was the fairest of them all. Over all gifts offered to him by divinity, he chose a woman, not any but the one considered as the most beautiful. We can interpret it with what we have described, Paris was not the hierarchical leader, nor the one closest to take such position at Priam's death. He could not compete in battle, nor in rank with Hektor, but choosing Helen made him metaphorically claim a higher rank. That Helen gave rank and was considered as full of respect even by Hektor is a tradition that can be appreciated not only in the Iliad but in Chaucer's Troilus and Cressida (Windeatt and Chaucer, 1992). And is it not foreign women who avoid reproductive suppresion, and could it be not that Helen avoided internal conflict among Priam's offspring? Was it not Hektor fighting a war over his brother's deeds as any primate would do for his kin with numerical superiority to get females and avoid reproductive suppression?

Although there can be a discussion whether the story narrated by Homer really happened or not, what is of interest to us isn't the historical precision but the

description of social structures and behaviors that, as Saunders (1991) says, are "all too life-like". We can deduct from the Iliad that all the characters are aristocratic heroes that have a hierarchical position in their society, and that those who do not have such status are not depicted in the story. Saunders (1991) says the household social organization, *oikos* in Ancient Greece, is formed as follows:

> "the basic unit is the 'home' or 'estate' (*oikos*); it consists of a 'hero' at its head, his wife, children, first workmen and slaves, and their families. The terms 'lord' or 'squire' catch something of his position. The struggle for livelihood and the competition for resources are intense. The members of the *oikos* look to their lord for leadership, and expect under him to achieve security and prosperity. His role, therefore, is not one of ease and privilege; he needs a high degree of self-reliance; and he is judged by results. His overriding need is to gain *time*, in the concrete sense of 'possessions' or 'wealth', for use by himself and his *oikos*; and it is his *time* in this sense that is the foundation for his *time* in a second sense, the 'honour', 'status' or 'clout' which he possesses both within the *oikos* and in his relations with other heroes and the world in general"

We can observe how previous elements conforming personal spheres or its conditions of possibility can be encountered here, although when we look at them having reached this category, they present themselves more symbolic. For example, the fact of self-reliance that comes with reproduction and rank does not imply that in the Greek society mentioned, the higher ranks were the only ones to have possessive copulations. What it implies is that Helen, Briseus, Agamemnon,

Akhilleus, etc., were symbols (models, metaphors, external references for action)[17], although they were not the only humans in the time of the Iliad, they are the only ones depicted in the narrative because only them are recognized as able to gain wealth, women, possession and recognition in heroic battles (hierarchy), having the rest as participants of their achievements[18]. It was a structure for achieving security and prosperity, and their place was judged by results, as happens with the alpha male in the chimpanzees (De Waal and Waal, 2007). Although we can expect that aristocratic heroes copulated more, the radical difference with the chimpanzee's structure is that in ancient human societies although culturally and politically assimilating non-human primates' status and recognition, there was no longer immediate and direct connections, they became more metaphorical giving a new reality to what used to be directly linked in a different socio-reproductive organization.

Notwithstanding their culture was centered in the aristocratic heroes, and their similar functions (though now metaphorical) as the ones of the chimpanzee alpha males, new conflicts appeared. This came out of diverse claims over interests among households, and with the alpha rank that has dominion over all of them.

Such problem was well seen by Smith (2012) in Antigone which "is a play about conflict and its role in politics. Moreover, it is a play about conflict at several dif-

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[17]Taking the Iliad and the Odyssey as models for education was common even in Plato's time, aspect he condemns in the Republic (Brownson, 1897). But in fact, Plato's problem with education can be associated with the warrior class, which in Homer's Iliad happens to be the highest in rank and recognition. In fact, what Plato is doing is recognizing more classes, and a more complex society that requires more symbols than those depicted in the Iliad.

[18]Their achievements would allow the members of their house either slave or kin to have a physical space for their own and a family.

ferent levels: between the household (*oikos*) and the city (*polis*), between men and women, between nature and convention", and as the author says, it is a problem of where the loyalties are to be found. In it we can appreciate how Antigone represents the interests of the household, which now has a share of dominion, and how Creon represents the interests of the state or the alpha rank, but more abstract and less immediately linked with a person.

Another example of conflict between loyalties and claims over interests can be observed in Euripide's tragedy *Medea* (Murray et al., 1910). First, Jason migrates because it is impossible to get a rank for himself at the state of affairs encountered in his society. When migrating he gets help from Medea who betrays his father and because of her actions looses hierarchy becoming the adventurous lover of Jason. When coming back after getting recognition for his deeds (though aided by Medea), he knows his rank and that he can achieved a better one marrying the coryinth princess rather than the treacherous Medea, who has no rank now whatsoever and because of that cannot give status. In any case, she already gave children and was coming of age, so the reasonable thing to do for Jason was to search for a better maid if he was to pursue rank and increase his *oikos*. As she finds herself without the possibility of achieving social recognition or even of having a role, even her children lost meaning, depicting the social action we can oberve in chiumpanzees when using violence, that is, that "females sometimes joined males in attacking grown individuals", as Medea did for Jason at the beginning of the tragedy, "but when acting without males, females killed only young infants" (Wilson et al., 2014), as Medea did with her own children. If she was deprived of the possibility of a role, she got her metaphorical revenge taking the role of Jason,

that is, his reproductive hierarchical rank.

The importance of symbolically recognizing each male as a breeder, made possible a distribution of dominion within each household. Each breeder has dominion at least within the members of his home, receiving recognition for it and creating the conflicts just mentioned above. This aspect can be seen in ancient Greek, Roman and Jewish societies (Hezser, 2005) where:

> "In being subordinate to and dependent on the householder, wives, children, and slaves resembled each other. In being either free or enslaved and possessing or lacking honour they differed from each other, though. The relationship of fathers towards children and husbands towards wives was in many ways similar to the master-slave relationship. Yet all of these relationships also evinced certain dissimilarities which point toward the specific ways in which power was distributed within the family".

In this way, dominion was recognized and distributed to each householder "to control and regulate a sphere which was commonly considered to be chaotic and threatening to the proper order of society" (Hezser, 2005). It is as Smith (2012) realizes, a problem to recognize now the ultimate source of personal authority, but with such problem something interesting develops, that is, denser societies which also makes them more complex.

2.6   Complex societies and moralizing religion

Denser societies become necessarily more complex, there are greater incentives for commerce, symbols for trust, traditions that make each household to be recognized as a member of something that united them all. Also, the status signs exhibiting a past where the actual higher rank shows the "expectation of the outcome of any future confrontations" (Wilson, 1978) become less compelling as society gets more complex. It is no longer possible for an Alpha male or to a complex bureaucracy to excerpt threats, which have the function of avoiding conflict. How can one person or a group of organized persons excerpt threats effectively when society has grown beyond their possibilities to do so, and already reduced reproductive suppression. Such growth in complexity can turn the state of things very unstable, so a mechanism is needed for "establishing common identities across states and empires" (Whitehouse et al., 2019).

In dominance systems, social networks become more complicated by triangular or circular organizations (Wilson, 1978), when they become unstable the changes tend to straight chain hierarchies (Wilson, 1978). It means that despotism has a function, to bring stability and order, so when the higher rank is occupied it follows a minimum amount of hostile exchange (Wilson, 1978; De Waal and Waal, 2007), allowing peace to be more common. In order to maintain density and with it the complexity achieved, that would be lost returning to despotic or straight chain hierarchies, moralizing gods are developed, meaning "that moralizing gods follow – rather than precede – large increases in social complexity" (Whitehouse et al., 2019).

What has been said explains why in Genesis it is "introduced a hierarchy based on the capacity to initiate activity" (Smith, 2012). This principle as the author clarifies is shared by men, who are created in God's image, that is, "it is through language that man expresses his dominion over the various objects of creation" (Smith, 2012). Naming and creating metaphors conform the framework to understand reality, reaching what was already given by social complexity, that is, the achievement of households. But now that a divine metaphorical reality is created, it is used as if it has always existed, explaining the creation or even including in its sphere households, because "man is not intended to live a solitary life but to live as part of a couple or a family" (Smith, 2012). A morality is enforced, human interactions are regulated by a divine myth as if such morality had not existed before the allegedly fall, taking meaning and content with this new divine moralizing metaphor that comes from social complexity, but now that it is created,— works as if preceding it. The external references for action supersede one another, creating loyalty conflicts over household, state or alpha rank stability, an omniscient God or an inescapable karma for that matter. Such conflict can be seen in Samuel 1:8-9 (Biblia, 2005) where God claims the lack of loyalty of the people and allows them to have a King, so they can live the atrocities that come with political dominion after rejecting Yahve to live as the other nations.

A limit to the dominion of the State or high rank of the society can be seen in the figure of a moralizing God. For example, King David who answers to no one and plays tricks to take out a loyal subordinate so he can keep his woman, nonetheless, his actions did not go unnoticed, we can see in the text that they

were unpleasant to the eyes of Yahve (Biblia, 2005).

Loyalty problems will appear to be solved mixing state with religion or keeping each sphere apart. Before that happens, it is warned against making rulers as gods or demigods (Smith, 2012) claiming loyalty to only one God against it. Such superstition or giving such divine powers to a chief or leader or to a group of persons is not something that should clash with logic. It is easy to see them as all powerful out of their means to bring stability to society, and mostly to keep the admiration to the rank and the signs that come with it. Nonetheless, dominion is dissipated, and though religion or a moralizing god works perfectly to the aims of a ruler and overcomes his limitations, it is also a cession of dominion to something abstract beyond his position. They may not answer to the people but for sure they are to answer God.

Chapter 3

Results: Condition of possibility for individual existence

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3.1 The Individual Human Being

Before describing what we consider a necessary but not sufficient condition for individual existence, we ought to develop some sensibility around the dynamic of social relationships we can find from the seventeenth-century literature onward. That is, how they differentiate in phenomenons as stratification, social mobility, authority, and dominion. Although an extensive and thorough description of most literary works would certainly be helpful, it is not our purpose to make literary critic, but to use those who can aid and show the core of our thesis.

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[1]I am grateful to PhD Manuel Gil Antón for suggesting that what we were looking for was the condition of possibility for the individual. It aided to organize the information towards that goal.

One of the impressions we get after reading the Mio Cid (Cátedra and Morros, 1992), or Arthur's knights (Knowles, 2016), as well as the already mentioned epic of the Iliad, is that heroes do not change. Mio Cid was always in the pursuit of rank and recognition, even when his daughters got beaten, he retaliates out of the personal shame such act produced for the lack of recognition towards him. We cannot imply in the text an internal narrative over such event, nor remorse or guilt for being treacherous with the Jew, who, after giving him a loan, receives death by Cid's hand in return. What we appreciate in Cid's poem is the pursuit of rank and recognition by a mercenary who suddenly became so strong that the King himself had to expel. Our modern eyes would quickly come to a rage; how could he get rid of such a good soldier? From a personal point of view, however, the King's choice can be entirely understood. Cid was getting closer to the notion of deserving more recognition and rank for his military deeds. While the King, like Agamemnon, had all the symbolic dominion that came with rank but was already becoming idle. His move, like that of Agamemnon, is the one expected to use his political alliances to get rid of the threat of numerical superiority. Cid, as a social animal, had three options, either to queue, to engage in internal conflict having the odds against him in an already stratified society that had no place for him, or to migrate. He chose the last one. Migration is something so frequent as a consequence of a social scheme that it is present also in the next example.

Beowulf (Lerate and Lerate, 1986) is no exception to the unchanging character of the warrior. His adventures and deeds address rank and recognition, that is why he migrates in the first place. As he can be expected to be judged over

self-reliance, and for achieving security for his realm, we can understand why even when coming of age, he could not reject to fight with the dragon. If he had sent someone else or claimed old age, he would have compromised his rank and position. As De Waal and Waal (2007) shows, in primate societies, when the alpha-male no longer is political, no longer achieves results or starts to become old, the other members start making alliances to take him out. Our heroes in this type of epics and literature, die with their rank. Beowulf died confronting the dragon because his existence was linked with the dominion and social relationships that came with a hierarchical role. Cid shares the same fate as Beowulf, in his last battle, tied to his horse, is that this hierarchical hero wins the battle after being already dead.

In the epic of Arthur and his Knights, we find no inner life whatsoever, nor in Beowulf, or Cid's epic poems, the heroes never change. It is known what to expect from each one of them from the beginning. It is representative how they aim only to the pursuit of status when a knight aids an "enslaved" princess, resulting in the rejection of the knight until he gets more recognition for his deeds, that is, more hierarchy[2]. We can infer from the text that women are a symbol of dominion, as in the Iliad. In all their suffering for love, though different in degree with ancient times, the chivalry submission of a knight to a maiden glorifies passion as Rougemont (1979) points out, but not in an individual stance as Rougemont (1979) argues. They respond to external references and their pursuit of a role. As romantic as we may be compelled to see the romantic tragedy of Abelard and Heloise (Abélard et al., 2003), the former is punished and mutilated (losing repro-

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[2]In Knowles (2016) Lady Lyones, after being rescued, says: "Go thy way as yet, Sir Beaumains, for thou shalt not wholly have my love until thou be among the worthiest knights of all the world. Go, therefore, and labor yet in arms for twelve months more, and then return to me".

ductive hierarchy) by the uncle of Heloise precisely when he was getting most of his recognition. The problem of Heloise's uncle appears not to be the love he has for his niece, but the loss of opportunity to climb socially with a good marriage out of Abelard's intrusion. They finished their lives migrating or moving to another social sphere, the religious one.

What then are those elements we are to find in the individual of modern literature? What makes Shakespeare take the title Bloom (1998) recognizes in him as the creator of the human being. In every piece of literature before Shakespeare, individuals are absent, only personal relations with their masks and hierarchies in different spheres. In Bloom (1998) words:

> "Literary character before Shakespeare is relatively unchanging; women and men are represented as aging and dying, but not as changing because their relationship to themselves, rather than to the gods or God, has changed. In Shakespeare, characters develop rather than unfold, and they develop because they reconceive themselves. Sometimes this comes about because they overhear themselves talking, whether to themselves or to others. Self overhearing is their royal road to individuation".

Self-overhearing and individuation distinguish the individual, alongside the characteristics given in the introduction of this work, from personal existence. Hamlet, the vast expression of the individual, is so indeterminate, full of possibility, with the internal and changing narrative that he creates, to the point of being "a reflecting pool, a spacious mirror in which we need must see ourselves" (Bloom,

1998). Shakespeare (1969) shows us that mirror in the tragedy of Hamlet, where he takes his mother apart and forces her to stay to watch herself in the mirror he creates so that she can see her most inner being. Hamlet finds no sense in the world and exclaims that it had to be him the one to put it in order. He has to create his own schemes, the external ones that are given to him no longer have meaning. The warlike ghost of his father belongs to the tradition, to a hierarchical status substituted personally by Hamlet's uncle. If we think of the murder from a personal point of view, it is made precisely when the previous King became idle, at his rest, no longer wanting to expand his territory with wars, in other words, when he no longer represented his role. It cannot be judged as a wrong deed to take him out in a personal stance, for the murder brought political alliances and stability. The reason why Hamlet claims that there is nothing good or bad if the thought does not make it such (Shakespeare, 1969)[3].

To be or not to be takes meaning with this scheme, to be social and accept one's role, or not to be and become indeterminate, pure possibility, a self-creating value being. Otherwise, in Hamlet's expression in the cemetery, to know for real a man would be to know oneself (Shakespeare, 1969), to know the own schemes created to interpret the world. The reference suddenly cannot be an external model for action, "action requires the veils of illusion" (Bloom, 1998), there is no longer a social action but an illusion where "the self replaces the project of revenge" (Bloom, 1998). Revenge consists of a move to claim the external reference taken, the lack of recognition as happened with Cid when his daughters got beaten. This external world and its spheres have no interest in the pure individual and its in-

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[3]Such claim is as follows: "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so"

determination.

Shakespeare (1969) shows us what happens when a King decides to step aside from his role. When King Lear stops his reign suddenly and becomes idle, he receives disrespect, something that would be unthinkable of Cid or Beowulf, who avoid idleness taking their role to the grave. Their role is so external and has so much meaning moving others that even in their death, they are followed. That does not happen with Lear, he is not only rejected by his two daughters but treated as a weight, no longer of any use and as an outgrown child. Shakespeare (1969) shows us the loss of being with the rejection of rank, of a personal role. Likewise, is it not in Romeo and Juliet's tragedy where we can appreciate the total rejection of roles for an individual creation such as love? An unconditional love that comes not out of a personal sphere as Jason with Medea, the one Lear was so eager to find in his daughters but that when realizing he received it not, desires infertility to them, so they lose a social sphere. Love, as any concept belonging to the individual, also appears as contingent and negative, it requires to be what one has made of it, and not what families and hierarchies require. Therefore, Romeo and Juliet create their love, loosing with that all their social status, which can only culminate with their death. It differs from Troilus and Cressida, where, it seems, the tradition made Shakespeare keep personal schemes. Bloom Bloom (1998) recognizes that in this play, the characters have no character at all, they are without a substance and are only interesting out of their context, that is, when we want to individualize them. Troilus shows the chivalric passion for Cressida Rougemont (1979) speaks about, but when he has the possibility of keeping her by marriage, he steps back. The more passionate and reproductive suppressed he become with

Cressida's "dispersal behavior", the more evident his desire of rank acquisition .

With such characteristics presents Don Quixote (De Cervantes, 2015) as well, who breaks the personal tradition and becomes an individual when he creates his narrative as a knight. With an outstanding individual will, that is, without any external recognition, he arms himself a knight and makes maids out of prostitutes. So strong is the subordination of the object to the subject that those who laugh at him treat him as a knight and start considering themselves with worth. Worth that cannot come out of their role and consideration in a social sphere, but from the individual mirror that shapes into equality and possibility. Windmills stop being such, Don Quixote no longer adequates the subject to the object, he imposes his schemes, and they show their true nature, they are giants. Never does Cid or Beowulf ask themselves why is it necessary for them to fight, to pursue rank and recognition. In that matter, they are unchanging, while Don Quixote is always changing, to the point of losing his individuality and dying in a personal sphere. Interesting, though, that his death as a person makes clear the impossibility of suppressing social spheres, no matter how much they can be simplified.

3.2   Simplification of social spheres

It is interesting to observe that Middle Ages Institutions came with the necessity of increasing personal roles after the fall of Rome. As can be seen in Pirenne (2013), Roman Institutions came to an end because of Islam and not because of Germanic invasions as popularly thought Asimov (1968). Though they indeed weakened the Empire's frontiers, Germanic tribes wanted to live like Romans; they were eager to

find for themselves rank in that society. Most of them were living already as roman farmers (Asimov, 1968), were romanized and absorbed (Pirenne, 2013) to the point of having their costumes expressed in Roman Law (*Lex Visigothorum*) (Kunkel and Miquel, 1985; d'Ors and d'Ors, 1989). It was the Islamic invasion to the North of Africa, and with it, the conclusion of Rome's Mediterranean commerce the decisive blow upon the Empire, and what propitiated Kingdoms and Middle Ages Institutions (Pirenne, 2013)[4]. With the lack of commerce and colonies, they relied more on one another. The role of the members in that society became even more persona, which means more stratified and with complex relations of domination and subordination. Feudalism over all things depended upon loyalty as a system (Ganshof, 1996), contracts of subordination between a vassal and a feudal Lord required of external references, as a fief received by the vassal, as well as the sworn loyalty upon religious relics giving his hands to the feudal lord for the contract be valid (Ganshof, 1996). Overall, personal hierarchical and loyal relationships in its prime made this system efficient.

As we mentioned in the section of moralizing Gods, complex societies as feudalism, with all its personal spheres and claims over loyalty, required religion to achieve dominion over all spheres for stability. In Middle Ages Philosophy God is taken as *Being*, always active and the creation participating in his being, and contingent entities cannot give themselves being, but can only participate in the one of God (Gilson, 2004). In this aspect, "all Christian philosophers recognize

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[4]Though Rome, its institutions and commerce perished with the presence of Islam, not the idea of Rome. The idea of Rome and the Empire lasted symbolically throughout feudalism (Ganshof, 1996; Asimov, 1968; Pirenne, 2013). Pirenne (2013) argues that the Church represented the continuity of Rome by excellence.

that even when the creative act is conceivable, it is not representable. We never create, and we are unable to create; we are therefore unable to represent a truly creative action" [5](Gilson, 2004). Such inability comes out of only participating in the creation, which implies that we can only adequate our intellect to the object, not create it, or put schemes on it. Remember that Agustín (1999) looked for many options to have external references for action in his youth but finished with God as the most useful, which smoothly happened in a society full of Christian external referents.

Another example is Saint Anselm of Canterbury, who seems like an extreme realist. Though his realism is understandable in the context mentioned above, he needed first to believe, that is, to take the given external references, and then use his reason. Therefore, his thought lies upon the following principles synthesized by Gilson (2007) :

1. "a notion of God supplied by faith"

2. "to exist in thought is to truly exist"

3. "the existence of the notion of God in thought logically demands the affirmation that God exists in reality"

As we can appreciate, there is not self-creating values or own referents, but taken by faith, an external principle that can only exist in a given society, to end with

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[5]The translation is my own from the original: "todos los filósofos cristianos reconocen que aun cuando el acto creador es concebible, no es representable. Jamás creamos, y somos incapaces de crear; somos, pues, incapaces de representarnos una acción verdaderamente creadora" (Gilson, 2004)

the given principle in thought.

The non-creative persons of the Middle Ages used the received metaphors for action filling every social sphere with it, to the point that nothing happened that was not in God's plan. What was not in God's plan were those who suddenly found themselves outside of every possible role, where even if wanting to be part of a guild, nobility, to be someone's vassal or in synthesis, to find themselves in a relation of domination-subordination, could not. That is, they could not establish themselves in what we have identified as the conditions for personal existence or social spheres.

The conditions described in the second chapter of this work do not produce individual but personal existence; the need for acceptance produced the appearance of more complex social spheres. Although succeeding one another and becoming more metaphorical and less biologically linked, such conditions do not cease to be external references to interpret the world. What they allow in their nature is nothing but roles, that is, the household keeper or *"paterfamilias"*, the leader or alpha rank, kin or tribe formation for internal reduction of violence. Such an aspect is present in ancient Greece, where the justice problem resides in the collective life organization of the city members (Sabine et al., 1945). That is why Sabine et al. (1945) says that the law's purpose is finding a position for each member. Such need to organize with external references the communal life ceased along with Middle Ages Institutions the moment a group was left outside. A group that could not queue because they could not wait for commerce did not migrate and could only but promote instability for a structural transformation. The need to substitute an

exhausted structure of social spheres found in its simplification good allies such as the protestant reform and liberalism, which, without having such intention, aided absolute monarchies, concentrating dominion in the monarch so the rest of the spheres could be dissolved or simplified.

Sabine et al. (1945) argues that the outcome of Lutheranism was the destruction of the Universal Church, the abolition of monastic institutions, and ecclesiastical corporations, the abolition of canonical law, and overall the suppression of the religious, social sphere with the strengthening of monarchies as an outcome. The socio-structural transformation just mentioned was the expected move for allowing commerce, new routes, and attain recognition and rights that were not possible with feudal hierarchies and privileges[6]. We can expect that when the recognition of a powerful emerging group is lacking, which justifies conflict or the possibility to engage in it with the hierarchies already established. As this new group acquires increasing power, the more it needs to dissolve hierarchies and privileges. In order to do so, it allows the consolidation of a Monarch with absolute power, which means, reuniting the dominion the previous social spheres used to have. More and more, a group that belonged not to any social sphere, but that was claiming recognition became more powerful, to the point that it could only either migrate and insert itself in some social sphere that was not exhausted, or tear down the social orga-

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[6]Freeden (2015) recognizes that liberalism began at the end of the Middle Ages "as a movement to release people from the social and political shackles that constrained and frequently exploited them. Tyrannical monarchs, feudal hierarchies and privileges, and heavy-handed religious practices combined to create a sense of oppressiveness that became increasingly difficult to bear, and that steadily fell out of step with the advent of the modern world. The rise of liberal ideas is, therefore, linked to great social changes that were occurring across Europe. One of them was the challenge to religious monopolies, as secular powers sought to escape the control of the Church"

nization where they had no inclusion. The chosen option was the latter. However, the difference of the outcome of breaking a social organization resides in the fact that the common ground used to be the restoration of straight-chain hierarchies for stability, with the proper recognition of roles and the subsequent development of social spheres or complexity by degree. Whenever a breakage of that kind appeared, the outcome was the acquisition of personal attributes that come with a specific position. What the socio-structural transformation produced, alongside the protestant reform (Sabine et al., 1945) and liberalism[7], was a simplification, in other words, Absolute Monarchies, the opposite they expected. Absolutism broke all those social spheres that were already exhausted, not allowing social mobility. The problem stops being as Berlin (2014) says, on why should a man obey another one or a group of men for that matter, that is clear the moment we accept ourselves as social persons. The real problem of political philosophy resides on how to give meaning to the void left when suppressing social spheres. When the latter happens, then the problem resides on sociability, as Arendt (1989) claims was the problem of Kant in his late years.

A void emerged, but instead of filling it with external personal recognition, something else came to the scene. That is the individual, the self-creating its values without social spheres to give the content. Such an attitude is manifest in the appearance of moderation as a rule for subjects and rulers, but this time it "meant government with no clear boundary between inward and outward" (Shagan, 2011).

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[7]It is easy to think whether a protestant reform by itself or liberalism could have produced the structural breakdown. What we propose is that they, alongside the disintegration of the structure by exhaustion, produced the new state of affairs, but by themselves or without the propper circumstances they would have been in infertile soil to produce an outcome

When all the complexity is simplified, and no external reference is left, then the individual is possible, it arose out of this socio-structural transformation. It filled the void left by "the stark absence of any ethics that was not at heart about the maintenance of public order" (Shagan, 2011). What is left is the individual, and with the lack of the previous external references, the possibility of creating its self-created values in a contingent environment.[8]

In such contingency, Descartes (2008) made his appearance. After losing certainties, he needs doubt as a criterion where only that which cannot be subject to doubt ought to be true. He finds that existence depended on sharing being with God, but without that referent, he subdues existence to doubt. In contradiction of Medieval thought where God's existence is a principle through faith, as well as his creation, which shares his *Being* or existence. Descartes (2008) takes nothing for granted, as he even doubts his existence, he has to reach through doubt the distinction between awareness and dream. He takes away every external referent to find himself with the pure *I*, which has an existence in the fact that when doubting, it is exercising thought, a mental operation. Therefore, if he doubts he thinks, and by thinking he can claim his existence. Therefore, existence comes from an internal reference, an aspect that was only possible with a doubt that left a naked and internal *I*, with the exclusion of tradition or any external referent.

When all external referents tore apart, it is easy to appreciate a "war of all against all" (Hobbes, 1946). The simplification of social spheres became so fierce

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[8]The fact that the Church dissolved as a social sphere made possible its integration with the monarch or the secular sphere. That's why the reform became govermental as Shagan (2011) claims.

that Hobbes (1946) was influenced by that conflict in his political thought. In a situation so unstable and contingent, without given grounds as referents for action and with moving hierarchies, Hobbes (1946) saw the pure *I* as the principle from which organization and society were to emerge. Social organization, as an external referent, could no longer be taken for granted. As all external referents were changing and becoming unstable, the beginning for Hobbes (1946) was a model where individuals, beings that already recognize their pure *I*, are found without hierarchies. As there are no dominant-submissive relations, individuals can take whatever they find in nature, but soon find themselves that others can and also do the same, and in doing so have claimed over what they consider to be their own. A conflict out of taking out every external referent emerges, that is, the problem of equality that can only come with individual existence. With feudal loyalties gone, it appears hierarchical order is found nowhere, but Hobbes (1946) found that in such state of affairs individuals do not differ from each other, that equality is the possibility for anyone to become a threat, that without distinction there are no boundaries for individuals to take what they want, therefore, a war of all against all appears out of an individual product we call equality. For that reason, to end with equality and such prone to war state of affairs, Hobbes (1946) proposes the Leviathan, to whom individuals pact to give part of their freedom in what is called a social contract, in order to find themselves no longer in a contingent and unstable situation but in a dominant-submissive and necessary situation where the external referent for action is the *Leviathan*. Though, in this case, individuals gave themselves their external referent. What Hobbes (1946) appears to be doing in our interpretation is the submission of society as an external referent to the cartesian *I*.

This view might explain why Kant by the end of his life questioned himself on "the fact that no man can live alone, that men are interdependent not merely in their needs and cares but in their highest faculty, the human mind, which will not function outside human society" (Arendt, 1989). For him, progress conforms to nature's project (del Barco Collazos, 1984). That is why he conceives individual existence as something necessary for maintaining society or the whole; it aided to fill the void when the simplification of social spheres happened. The individual is part of progress; for that reason, it has that purpose. We can see such Kantian claim in Arendt (1989) where:

> "Progress is the progress of the species and is thus of little avail to the individual. But the thought of progress in history as a whole, and for mankind as a whole, implies disregard of the particular and directing one's attention, rather, to the "universal" (as one finds it in the very title of the "Idea of a Universal [General] History") in whose context the particular makes sense –to the whole for the existence of which the particular is necessary. This escape, as it were, from the particular, which is in itself meaningless, to the universal"

Therefore, individuality follows the purpose of nature, which has, as a consequence, that "most men... have their best-loved selves fixed before their eyes as the only point of reference for their exertions, and ... seek to turn everything around *self interest* as around the great axis. Nothing can be more advantageous than this, for these are the most diligent, orderly, and prudent; they give support and solidity to the whole, while without intending to do so, they serve the common good" (Arendt, 1989). Kant, therefore, takes the individual as a mean for

keeping society, solving the dichotomy of individuality against society created in the scheme we saw in Hobbes (1946).

A new metaphor is created. The "I," and its internal narrative, is a reference dissociated from personal spheres, which still belongs to the realm of the *"persona"*. The real conflict of politics, or whom to obey, arises when the metaphorical "I" clashes with the external analog-made references of the *"persona"*. The conflict we think was saw by Hobbes (1946) who proposed to solve it with the submission of social hierarchies to the individual will, that is, the submission of necessity to contingency. Nonetheless, we think the solution proposed by Kant (1892) is more appropriate, that is, to find the contingency of the individual as part of nature's order, or in our interpretation, as a mean of a specific social animal for maintaining stability and hierarchy.

In synthesis, the simplification of social spheres is what makes the individual's illusion possible[9]. Though it is not the only condition, it comes naturally from the development of the elements of this work. The reason why the individual could not emerge in the Renaissance as Burckhardt (1935) proposes. He makes that statement because he founds men who became self-taught, travelers with a cosmopolitan view, and an intense humanism taken from the classics. The reason why he proposes that "wit could become an independent element in life only when it is appropriate, the developed individual with personal pretentions, appeared" (Burckhardt, 1935). However, in all those elements shown by the author, we find

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[9]The idea of taking the individual as an illusion of a realizaed intention came at a JarBar meeting, and it was suggested by PhD Manuel Gil Antón

not a pure I; on the contrary, they take the external referents of the classics. Even Machiavelli (2008) longs for an Absolute Monarchy to end the complicated situation of given personal loyalties. So it is a desire for the possibility that would make the individual emerge, but not the condition and therefore a political conceptualization about it yet.

Chapter 4

Discussion and Conclusion

Whom do we owe loyalty? Is it to our own individual and self-created values or the designated masks full of tradition that makes social action possible? The problem, we think, resides in thinking that different claims come from the gradual development of the conditions of possibility for personal existence. Such conflicts are between spheres that are related to growing complexity. That is why "Antigone" is a tragedy, because there is no escape from deciding which loyalty is better, familiar ties and their tradition or state (alpha rank), each one depending on the other[1]. They are part of the social development for reducing the possibility of engaging in subject-subject conflict[2]. As they are part of the same development, corresponding to external referents for action which confer masks in society (father, paterfamilias, King, among others), no possible choice can be determined as right, better, or

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[1]This coincides with Aristóteles (2000) who claims that cities have their existence by nature, because it is the purpose of all the other first communities. It is in this aspect that the Greek author recognizes the degree difference of the same development among families (separate households), and the city or state, which we have claimed conforms to the alpha rank.

[2]Among the many other things that developed earlier, such as genetic variability, achieving denser societies with more possibility of survival, our Pandora's hypothesis with the consequence of independent households, social complexity, and the like.

just. In the end, decisions are made according to social (personal) utility as can be seen in the laws of Platón (2008), where the government cannot be only for the "good" citizens but for good and evil, using laws to reconcile them in order to achieve the common good. Likewise, Cicero resolved: "rather than judging what is useful, wisdom itself is thus subjected to the norm of utility" (Colish, 1978), and also in Machiavelli (2008) "The Prince" which is a manual or set of advice for keeping power (dominion) without principles or values whatsoever. Conflict in personal spheres solves itself by the utility, which cannot happen in an individual framework.

Only in individual existence can there be principles, which are internal and self-created. With individual existence, as Berlin (2014) claims, values, ideals, and goals are not discovered but created. Contrarily to the person, who depends on a sphere that gives meaning to it, according to a role, and where individualism has no place. The person inhabits many spheres with variable linkage, but the possibility of his actions is always determined externally. In static societies without individual existence, such as feudalism, birth determines hierarchy, and acquired ties are only established ties, as sworn loyalty of a vassal to a Feudal Lord (Ganshof, 1996), hardly any other change. Being a paterfamilias, citizen or not, in the Roman Republic settles values and doings(Kunkel and Miquel, 1985). Utility in personal references is given by society, which explains the absence of ethical conflict in the classical tragedies arising over conflicting spheres.

The clash among individual and personal existence resides no longer in claims over interests of different external references, but in the confrontation of such ref-

erences with internal ones. The conflict just described is evident in Nietzsche's conservatism. Nietzsche (Nietzsche et al. (2009)) argued that the new values are those of the weak, which clash with the none resentful, full of strength and vitality of the warrior, and mostly, with rank. He is aware of the importance of hierarchy and rank in a personal sphere and criticizes its cession of dominion to reason, which generates social disorder. His criticism reaches Nietzsche (2000a) the Kantian division of a real and an apparent world. Of course, he cannot accept the submission of the world to the subject because that would imply breaking the hierarchical order personal rank gives, and the values that externally and eternally come from it. In the introduction made by the translator of (Nietzsche, 2000b), he claims that the main idea of Nietzsche's is that life produces individuation and that it means tearing apart the social culture, so it has to reintegrate it with the annihilation of individualities. Returning to the origin is to come back to social spheres of antiquity, before their simplification.

Although Nietzsche wants to take Hamlet as a Dionysiac man[3] (Geuss and Speirs, 1999), that is because in his scheme knowledge cannot come from reason, and the most representative figure of tragedy ought not to be Apolline. The main reason being that the "Apolline artist glorifies individuality by presenting attractive images of individual persons, things and events" (Geuss and Speirs, 1999). For us, Hamlet cannot represent the Dyonisiac; that would mean being a personal

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[3] "In this sense Dionysiac man is similar to Hamlet: both have gazed into the true essence of things, they have acquired knowledge, and they find action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to change the eternal essence of things; they regard it as laughable or shameful that they should be expected to set to rights a world so out of joint. Knowledge kills action; action requires one to be shrouded in a veil of illusion –this is the lesson of Hamlet, not that cheap wisdom about Jack the Dreamer who does not get around to acting because he reflects too much, out of an excess of possibilities" (Geuss and Speirs, 1999)

metaphor, which he is not. Hamlet and Don Quixote form the modern individual human being; they express their individuality clashing with personal spheres. The individual, therefore, has its conflict with the tendency of returning to complex social spheres, and not to keep the simplicity that made it possible in the seventeenth century.

The conflict individual-estate, in any of its forms, can only, perhaps, be solved according to a utility. Renounce to one's rights to reclaim order, claim one's freedom to overtake a dictator, whatever is convenient. The source of the conflict, however, lies more rooted in the subject, between the individual and the *persona* that dwells in each modern human being, and convenience cannot solve it.

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